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Introduction
Giovanni Maddalena and Fernando Zalamea
1 Perhaps due to the period of international crisis, appeals to creativity multiplied in any
field. Sure enough, when the status  quo cannot grant welfare conditions  anymore, 
something new is needed. And the problem of novelty intertwines that kind of thought
that goes by the name of creativity. Philosophically speaking, this request means to 
question what  creativity  really  is,  which  are  its  cognitive  processes,  whether  it  is
teachable, and where it comes from.
2 A first methodological question is about the science that should take care of such an
important topic.  Creativity has often been considered too high (a  gift  from gods,  a
normative  look  from outside  the  world),  too  low (unconscious  or  abysmal),  or  too
lateral (something to relegate to pre-theoretical intuitions) to be observed and studied.
When it was studied philosophically,  creativity has often been pigeonholed into the
aesthetic cage as if it had not to enter other fields of knowledge.
3 Pragmatism assumed a different attitude towards the creative moment from the start.
Classical pragmatists’ common stance was a profound idea of continuity of experience,
scientifically or epistemologically considered and expressed. With different nuances all 
of  them  avoided  dualisms,  dichotomies  and  severed  approaches  to  experience.
“Experience” itself has to be treated with a whole, or rather a continuity, to which our
thoughts and intellectual endeavors belong as well as objects, actions, practical habits,
and values.  Creativity  is  no  exception  and  it  belongs  to  this  common,  continuous
ground  of  experience.  Therefore,  a quick look at the conception  of continuity  is 
important to understand what creativity is and how authors handle it in this issue of
the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy.
4 Here  continuity  has  to  be  understood  in  the  Peircean  sense.  From  the  analytic
mathematical standpoint it remains a hypothesis. However, it is a working hypothesis 
that recent  mathematical  studies  seem to  confirm.  This  hypothesis  regards  a  non-
metrical kind of continuity that consists in a transition among logical and ontological 
modalities (possibility, actuality, necessity) governed by the properties of reflexivity,
generality,  modality  (plasticity),  each underlying  one  aspect  of  the  relationship
between  the  parts  and  the  whole  of  continuity.  Taking  these  terms  in  their
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philosophical  meaning,  we can say that generality is  the law of cohesiveness among
parts beyond any individual and any possibility of metrically measuring it;  modality 
means plasticity, namely the fact that a continuum is not tied to actualities but involves 
both possibility and necessity; reflexivity means that any part shall  have  the  same
properties of the whole to which it belongs. This hypothesis of continuum explains that 
experience  is a very complex  pattern that is always evolving: experience is  really
experience of a change, as James would have said. On this result classic pragmatists
converged.  With  different  perspectives  that  range  from  psychology  to  logic,  from
sociology to epistemology, all of them accepted experience as a continuity.
5 Creativity  is  thus  a  peculiar  kind  of  change  that  happens  within  this  changing
experience.  The  peculiarity  is  due  to  the  fact  that  creativity  seems  connected  to
something new, which would be by definition something that breaks continuity. Late
Peirce’s  view  on  continuity,  classic  pragmatists’  considerations,  and  recent
mathematical  studies  show  that  discontinuity  in  metrical  terms  can  be  conceived
within the sort of continuity to which they were hinting and aiming. In this kind of
continuous path, any break is more the realization of a possibility than an absolute
rupture. In this way, it is possible to conceive creativity as an operation on a novelty
that emerges within experience.
6 The articles of this volume suggest some of the characteristics that are consequence of
this understanding  and that raise from  both  the historical and the theoretical
treatment of pragmatism.
7 The first consequence of this conception of experience on the topic of creativity is that
this  phenomenon  cannot  be  relegated  to  any  irrational  or  a-rational  moment,  or
rather, that the creative moment is part of knowledge. The papers of this volume well
explain that creativity is linked to cognitive processes in all pragmatists’ works. James’,
Dewey’s,  Santayana’s  (Mollard),  and  Peirce’s  conceptions  of  “imagination”  and
“creativity” (Barrena, Zalamea, Tschaespe) are completely embodied in experience and
they are bound to perception and to the process of cognition that develops in it and
from it. We are somehow creative in any knowledge (Colapietro, Maddalena) and not
only in particular processes as abduction. From this perspective this volume overtakes
the usual approach that limits creativity to abduction and to the study of it. It shows
that pragmatists looked at creative imagination as constant part of cognitive processes
of any sort and that this part permits the highest degree of synthesis.
8 This profound understanding of creativity as part of knowledge implies a different view
of aesthetics, if aesthetics is the discipline that has to take care of this cognitive feature
as it has been affirmed traditionally. In different ways, Peirce and Dewey provided a
good alternative to any view of aesthetics as separated from the rest of the cognitive
path.  The  aesthetical moment is fundamental  in order to develop any form  of 
knowledge  because it is  part  of  the initial  apprehension  of  experience  and  of  any
reasoning: Dewey’s appreciation of imagination as pervasive element of any perception
in Art as experience and Peirce’s late but firm consideration of aesthetics as primeval
normative science that has to judge upon logical reasoning do not leave any doubts on
their approach. Far from being too high, low or lateral, imagination and the aesthetical
approach based on it are the pivot of our knowledge.
9 The second consequence is that in all pragmatist accounts creativity is an answer to an
external question. Externalism is one of the landmarks of pragmatism. Creativity is
part of  a continuity of experience that invests us,  whether you read it  semiotically
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(Peirce, Dewey), psychologically (James), or sociologically (Dewey, Mead). Toro’s paper
suggests that also in Rorty’s more controversial position on this topic, we can see that
creativity is historically embodied and we cannot abandon cognitive conditions that
come from experience.
10 As for the crucial  issue of  the novelty that  seems to break continuity,  the creative
moment is something new, but the articles make clear that there is no newness without
a profound acceptance of  this  flux of  experience that precedes us.  Colapietro’s  and
Maddalena’s papers show this game that involves both the belonging to this flux and
the modification of it that we name creativity. Moreover, all the papers show that a
pragmatist understanding of creativity can never be but highly critical of any romantic
overstress on singularity and personalities, since any pragmatist was and is convinced
of the deep fallibility that lays at the bottom of human experience. Newness is always a
modification of something which is already part of experience, and newness always has
to show up within an understandable situation and cognitive pattern. Absolute novelty
would be utterly incomprehensible.
11 The third consequence of a continuous approach is the unity of the practical and the
theoretical  aspects  of  creativity.  Inquiring on some Peirce’s  manuscripts,  Zalamea’s
article shows that the creative answer to reality comes as a practical-theoretical event
in which the actual scribing is as important as the theoretical insight. They operate
together without any chance to divide them up. This profound unity is what Maddalena
advocates in his suggestion of creativity as “complete gesture,” explaining it with the
semiotic and phenomenological characteristics that he derives from Peirce. It is also
the ground for a study of musical creative performance as jazz, which is the example
that clarifies Colapietro analysis of creativity grounded on Peirce’s and Cavell’s inputs.
12 A fourth consequence is that creativity is part of any discipline, or instead that the
division of subjects and methods does not work in the moment of creativity. Zalamea’s,
Barrena’s, Tschaepe’s and Mollard’s papers show that the creative moment 
pragmatistically understood is part of very different studies and different interests as
science and religion, ethics and mathematics.  In their studies on Peirce, James, and
Dewey they  show that  classic  pragmatists  were  using  a  rational  approach to  these
disciplines and that this critical attitude appealed to creative imagination as decisive
tool. Zalamea’s work illuminates this experience that is quite shared by all those that
really  perform  scientific  inquiry:  when  research  reaches  its  peaks  made  of  highly
problematic questions,  the division among subjects and sciences does not work any 
longer. Imagination, sense of beauty, dialogue, calculations, and technical devices are
all involved in the experience of creativity, no matter the field under investigation. All
divisions do not make sense anymore because, as we have seen, aesthetical judgments
are  needed  in  order  to  reason  and  the  quest  for  an  answer  to  the  problem  that
experience arises can come from any part. Many creative moments in any field are due
to connections and links that someone realizes while they were left severed before.
13 A final question arises. If creativity has to be understood within the continuous path of
experience, any newness that creativity recognizes and fosters is accountable also from
an ontological standpoint? This is the topic of the study of James and Whitehead that
Brioschi develops in her paper. The answer is not univocal in these two authors and
other papers touch upon this question hinting toward different answers: Mollard’s final
claim urges the possibility of a “realism with a divine face” while Colapietro refers to
Mead’s emergentism, an attitude somehow closer to Whitehead’s view of “process.” For
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sure creativity has to do with the mud (Zalamea) or the vagueness (Maddalena) of a
primeval inchoative state of experience that needs to be studied in a new creative way
also  from  an  ontological  perspective.  After  Roberto  Perry,  we  called  “horotic”  the
needed logic of borders (horos) that should be developed also in order to sink through
the terrain that gives birth to both new creative syntheses and more precise analyses.
This study would not settle the issue about naturalism either, but it probably will give a
better  non-ideological  perspective  on  this  very  complicated  ontological  and
metaphysical topic.
14 Certainly these few articles do not claim any sort of exhaustion of the problem, but we
hope they help introducing to a broad cognitive perspective on the topic and they can
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